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A Short Treatise on Amateurism
and Antitrust Law: Why the
NCAA’s No-Pay Rules Violate
Section 1 of the Sherman Act
Marc Edelman†
Abstract
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) oversees
nearly every aspect of the $11 billion college sports industry. Its
powers include scheduling championship events, determining
eligibility rules, entering into commercial contracts, and punishing
members that refuse to follow its authority. In recent years, some
NCAA members have become increasingly wealthy—grossing annual
revenues upwards of $100 million per year. Yet the NCAA’s rules still
deprive these members of the opportunity to share their wealth with
student-athletes.
This Article explains why the NCAA’s “no-pay” rules violate
section 1 of the Sherman Act. Part I introduces the NCAA, its
principle of amateurism, and its traditional enforcement mechanisms.
Part II provides a brief overview of section 1 of the Sherman Act—the
“comprehensive charter of economic liberty” in American trade.
Part III explains why the NCAA’s no-pay rules constitute both an
illegal form of wage fixing and an illegal group boycott. Part IV then
explores eight lower court decisions that incorrectly held the NCAA’s
eligibility rules were noncommercial and thus exempt from antitrust
scrutiny. Meanwhile, Part V analyzes four additional lower court
decisions that misconstrued the NCAA’s eligibility rules as
procompetitive under a rule of reason analysis. Finally, Part VI
concludes that even if a court were to find that competitive balance is
a reasonable basis for upholding certain no-pay rules, such rules still
should not be promulgated by the NCAA, but rather by individual
conferences.
†
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Introduction
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) oversees
nearly every aspect of the $11 billion college sports industry.1 Its
powers include scheduling championship events, determining
eligibility rules, entering into commercial contracts, and punishing
members that refuse to follow its authority.2 In recent years, some
NCAA members have become increasingly wealthy—grossing annual
revenues upwards of $100 million per year.3 Yet the NCAA’s rules
deprive these members of the opportunity to share their wealth with
student-athletes.4 Instead, the NCAA and its leaders hide behind a
“veil of amateurism” that maintains the wealth of college sports “in
the hands of a select few administrators, athletic directors, and
coaches.”5

1.

See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 88
(1984) (explaining that, since the NCAA’s inception in 1905, the NCAA
has “adopted and promulgated playing rules, standards of amateurism,
standards for academic eligibility, regulations concerning recruitment of
athletes, and rules governing the size of athletic squads and coaching
staffs”); see also Where Does the Money Go?, Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCA
A/Answers/Nine+points+to+consider_one (accessed by entering the
URL in the Internet Archive index) (stating that “[o]verall annual
revenue for college athletics programs for 2008–09 was estimated at
about $10.6 billion”).

2.

See infra Part I.A–B.

3.

See College Athletics Revenues and Expenses, ESPN.COM,
http://espn.go.com/ncaa/revenue (last visited Sept. 27, 2013) (showing
that, in 2008, five NCAA member schools grossed revenue in excess of
$100 million per year and several others were close to that threshold).

4.

See 2013–14 NCAA Division I Manual § 12.1.2, at 59 (2013)
[hereinafter
2013–14
Division
I
Manual],
available
at
http://www.ncaapublications.com/p-4322-2013-2014-ncaa-division-imanual.aspx (prohibiting, as part of the criteria for amateur status,
individuals from receiving various forms of “pay” in return for “athletics
skill or participation”); see also David Wharton, Plan Is on the Money
to Some: Conferences Will Have Option of Giving Student-Athletes an
Extra $2,000 a Year, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2011, at C1 (quoting Boise
State University President Robert Kustra’s position that, even though
student-athletes are unpaid, they “have it pretty good”);
NCAA Office of the President, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/NCAA+Presiden
t/NCAA+President+Mark+Emmert (last visited Sept. 27, 2013) (quoting
NCAA president Mark Emmert’s declaration that “[a]s long as [he is]
president of the NCAA, [it] will not pay student-athletes to play sports”).

5.

Amy Christian McCormick & Robert A. McCormick, The Emperor’s New
Clothes: Lifting the NCAA’s Veil of Amateurism, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
495 (2008) (arguing that college sports hide behind a “veil of amateurism”
because “[t]he idea that major college sports are amateur is demonstrably
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Although the NCAA rulebook has long evaded legal scrutiny,
courts are finally beginning to overturn certain aspects of the NCAA’s
rules that are deemed to be anticompetitive. For example, courts have
struck down the NCAA’s nationwide limits on televised football
broadcasts and its caps on assistant coaches’ salaries.6 Nevertheless,
the need to reform the college athletics industry extends far beyond
these areas. It is not just the outer fringes of the NCAA rules that
violate antitrust law: it is the whole shebang.
This Article explains why the NCAA’s no-pay rules violate
section 1 of the Sherman Act. Part I introduces the NCAA, its
principle of amateurism, and its traditional enforcement mechanisms.
Part II provides a brief overview of section 1 of the Sherman Act—the
“comprehensive charter of economic liberty” in American trade.7
Part III, applying precedent from the Supreme Court and the Tenth
Circuit, explains why the NCAA no-pay rules constitute both an
illegal form of wage fixing and an illegal group boycott. Part IV then
explores eight lower court decisions that incorrectly held the NCAA
eligibility rules were noncommercial and thus exempt from antitrust
scrutiny. Meanwhile, Part V analyzes four additional lower court
decisions that misconstrued the NCAA eligibility rules as
procompetitive under a rule of reason review. Finally, Part VI
concludes that even if a court were to find that competitive balance is
a reasonable basis for upholding certain no-pay rules, such rules still
should not be promulgated by the NCAA, but rather by the
individual conferences.

I.

The NCAA, Its Principle of Amateurism, and Its
Internal Enforcement Mechanisms
A.

The NCAA

The NCAA is the “dominant trade association” of American
colleges that compete in intercollegiate sports.8 It comprises
false”); Marc Edelman, Note, Reevaluating Amateurism Standards in Men’s
College Basketball, 35 U. MICH. J.L. Reform 861, 864 (2002).
6.

See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 88 (overturning the NCAA’s limits on
televised football broadcasts); Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir.
1998) (holding that a salary cap on “restricted-earnings” coaches is
illegal).

7.

N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). See also Reitner
v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (describing how the
Sherman Act economically protects people as individuals).

8.

Banks v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 850, 852 (N.D. Ind. 1990), aff’d, 977 F.2d
1081 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Coll. Athletic Placement Serv., Inc. v.
NCAA, No. 74-1144, 1974 WL 998, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 22, 1974)
(describing the NCAA as “the largest and most prestigious association
of colleges and athletic conferences in the United States”).
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approximately twelve hundred member schools that participate in
ninety-five different active athletic conferences.9 Its mission is to
promulgate playing rules, host championship events, enforce
standards of academic eligibility, and promote the general growth of
college athletics.10
The NCAA was first chartered in 1905 by trustees of sixty-two
colleges as a forum to discuss health risks in college sports.11 But by
the end of World War II, the NCAA had expanded its reach into
hosting sporting events and setting eligibility rules.12 In 1948, the
NCAA introduced its first written code to govern members’ recruiting
practices and financial aid payouts.13 Then, four years later, the
NCAA replaced that code with a broader set of rules to govern
membership, infractions, and punishment.14

9.

See Worldwide Basketball & Sport Tours, Inc. v. NCAA, 388 F.3d 955,
957 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that the NCAA’s membership includes more
than twelve hundre colleges); About the NCAA: Membership, Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/
public/ncaa/about+the+ncaa/membership+new (last updated Aug. 13,
2012) (stating that there are a total of 95 active NCAA conferences in
Division I, Division II, and Division III sports); see also Bd. of Regents,
468 U.S. at 99 (1984) (defining the NCAA as “an association of schools
which compete against each other to attract television revenues, not to
mention fans and athletes”).

10.

See Worldwide Basketball, 388 F.3d at 957 (explaining that the NCAA
“promulgates rules and regulations” pertaining to college sports); see
also Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147, 1153
(10th Cir. 1983) (describing the NCAA as “essentially an integration of
the rulemaking and rule-enforcing activities of its member institutions”),
aff’d, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Banks, 746 F. Supp. at 852 (explaining that
according to the NCAA’s constitution, its purpose is to maintain
amateur athletics “as an integral part of the educational program and
the athlete as an integral part of the student body and by so doing,
retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and
professional sports”).

11.

History, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, http://www.ncaa.org/
wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/About+the+NCAA/History
(last
updated Aug. 13, 2012).

12.

See
Enforcement,
Nat’l
Collegiate
Athletic
Ass’n,
http://web.archive.org/web/20130310042307/http://ncaa.org/wps/wcm
/connect/public/ncaa/enforcement/resources/chronology+of+enforcement
(last updated Jan. 21, 2013) (accessed using the Internet Archive index)
(noting the NCAA’s 1948 adoption of strict regulations and the
establishment of an investigative committee).

13.

See id. (describing the “Sanity Code” as “the first set of regulations
with teeth”).

14.

See id. (explaining the creation and scope of authority of the
Membership Committee and its Subcommittee on Infractions).
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Today, the NCAA operates pursuant to a formal constitution and
bylaws that are voted upon by its members.15 In addition, NCAA
members vote annually on committee members to “direct policy
between [annual] conventions.”16 As a condition of membership, all
NCAA colleges must agree to abide by the association’s written rules,
as well as by its committees’ decisions.17 Members do not have the
chance to opt out of rules based on their financial preference, nor do
they have the right to opt out on moral grounds.18
B.

The NCAA’s Principle of Amateurism and Its Enforcement

One area in which the NCAA establishes rules pertains to the
amateur status of student-athletes. The NCAA’s principle of
amateurism, as drafted and approved by its membership, states that
“student-athletes shall be amateurs in intercollegiate sport, and their
participation shall be motivated by education and by the physical,
mental and social benefits to be derived.”19 As such, the NCAA
bylaws limit the quantity of student-athletes’ financial aid to an
amount “set by the Association’s membership.”20 In addition, NCAA
bylaws prohibit student-athletes from accepting remuneration in any
form based on their status as athletes.21
15.

Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1282
(W.D. Okla. 1982), aff’d in part, remanded in part, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th
Cir. 1983), aff’d, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); see also Worldwide Basketball, 388
F.3d at 957 (noting that the NCAA “adopts bylaws formulated by a
legislative body drawn from the Association’s membership”).

16.

Warner Amex Cable Commc’ns v. Am. Broad. Cos., 499 F. Supp. 537,
540 n.2 (S.D. Ohio 1980); see also Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180, 183
(1998) (explaining that NCAA “member institutions agree to abide by
and enforce [association] rules”).

17.

See Worldwide Basketball, 388 F.3d at 957.

18.

E.g., 2013–14 Division I Manual, supra note 4, §§ 2.8, 3.1.1, 3.2.1.2,
3.2.4.1, at 4, 8–9 (setting forth the principle of rules compliance and
unequivocally requiring all members to adhere to the rules and
principles set forth in the NCAA constitution, bylaws, and legislation).

19.

Id. § 2.9, at 4 (setting forth the principle of amateurism); see also Marc
Edelman, Closing the “Free Speech” Loophole: Protecting College
Athletes’ Publicity Rights in Commercial Videogames, 65 FLA. L. REV.
553, 557 (2013) (quoting the principle of amateurism); cf. Kenneth L.
Shropshire, Legislation for the Glory of Sport: Amateurism and
Compensation, 1 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 7, 9 (1991) (“The payment
of money to amateur athletes has traditionally been viewed to be
contrary to the very essence of the true meaning of amateurism.”).

20.

2013–14 Division I Manual, supra note 4, § 12.01.4, at 57.

21.

Edelman, supra note 19, at 577 (citing 2011–12 Division I Manual,
§ 12.1.2, at 62 (2011), available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/
productdownloads/D112.pdf). NCAA no-pay rules were originally
intended to preserve the scarce number of college athletic opportunities
for members of the general student body. See Jennifer A. Mueller, The
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In modern times, the NCAA works tirelessly to enforce its
principle of amateurism.22 One way that the NCAA enforces this
principle is by levying penalties against members that provide
student-athletes with benefits beyond the NCAA-permitted amount.
Such penalties may include fines, the loss of television appearances, or
revocation of the opportunity to compete in postseason games.23 In
addition, the NCAA’s most severe penalty—colloquially known as the
“death penalty”—empowers the association to shut down any repeat
violator’s athletic program during regular-season competition.24
Since the NCAA first established its death penalty in June 1985,
the association has only enforced the sanction once, against Southern
Methodist University’s football team during the 1987 athletic season.25
This sanction resulted in Southern Methodist University’s dramatic
Best Defense Is a Good Offense: Student-Athlete Amateurism Should
Not Become a Fantasy, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 527, 534–35
(2009) (explaining how the NCAA’s principle of amateurism was
originally intended to “maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral
part of the student body”).
22.

See Steve Ellis, University Officials Approve Get-Tough Measures,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 22, 1985, at C1 (explaining why the NCAA
passed measures that called for “tougher penalties for cheaters and
greater institutional responsibility”).

23.

2013–14 Division I Manual, supra note 4, §§ 19.9.5.1–.2, 10.9.7(h), at
322–23.

24.

Id. §§ 19.9.3, 19.9.7(a), at 321–23 (authorizing the disciplinary panel
ban “specified competition in the sport during the regular season” and
enumerating aggravating factors, such as repeat violations, that would
justify such a penalty); see also Ellis, supra note 22 (describing the
death penalty as a “two-year ban on scholarships, recruiting, and
intercollegiate competition”); S.M.U. Awaits Decision, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 21, 1987, at 51 (describing the NCAA’s adoption of the death
penalty); NCAA Committee on Infractions, Southern Methodist
University Infractions Report 2 (Feb. 25, 1987) [hereinafter SMU
INFRACTIONS REPORT] (“At the June 1985 special Convention, the
NCAA membership enacted a series of mandatory penalties applicable
to member institutions found guilty of repeat major violations.”).

25.

See SMU Infractions Report, supra note 24, at 2 (“During the
period September 1985 through December 1986, monthly payments
ranging from $50 to $725 were made to numerous student-athletes in
the sport of football from funds provided by an outside representative of
the university’s athletics interests.”). The report also found that
“[thirteen] football team members received payments during the 1985–86
academic year that totaled approximately $47,000, and eight studentathletes continued to receive payments from September through
December 1986 that totaled approximately $14,000.” Id. See also Time
to Bench S.M.U.?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1986, at 26 (noting that SMU
was accused specifically of paying one student-athlete $25,000 to sign a
national letter of intent and arranging with another alumnus to provide
free housing for a student-athlete).
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loss of football-related revenues, not only for that particular season
but also for many years that followed.26 The economic annihilation of
Southern Methodist University’s football program continues to serve
as a powerful deterrent against other colleges paying their studentathletes.27
C.

How Fear of the “Death Penalty” Has Chilled Student-Athlete Pay
and Destroyed the Free Market for College Athletics
to the Detriment of Consumers

In recent years, most NCAA members have fully abided by the
NCAA’s principle of amateurism, even though it has meant that
college athletic directors and coaches earn millions of dollars while
their student-athletes continue to live below the poverty line.28 Even
in the cases in which a particular athletic director or coach has
wanted to improve his athletes’ standard of living, the NCAA
26.

See Michael Goodwin, N.C.A.A. Bans Football at S.M.U. for ’87
Season, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1987, at A1 (noting that shortly after the
NCAA sought to impose its death penalty, it seemed the sanction was
intended primarily to ensure that a school would be denied “important
sources of revenue”).

27.

See Ellis, supra note 22 (quoting Clemson University’s Bill Atchley, who
described the sanction as a “deterrent”); see also SMU INFRACTIONS
REPORT, supra note 24, at 2–6 (noting that the sanction in which an
NCAA member loses its ability to compete in a given sport is referred to
as the death penalty and is intended to have a “deterrent value for
others who might be tempted” to violate the NCAA rules, which held
true in the SMU case because, once the threat of such sanction became
recognized, there was “evidence of actions by the university to obtain
full compliance with NCAA regulations”); N.C.A.A. Acts Against
Kansas, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1988, at B9 (explaining that the NCAA’s
threat to give the University of Kansas basketball team such a sanction
led the university to cut ties with three boosters who were purportedly
paying the school’s athletes). See generally Joe Drape, Penalties Upheld
for Alabama and Kentucky, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2002, at D6 (quoting
the chairman of the NCAA Appeals Committee, Terry Don Phillips, as
saying that “[t]he death penalty would have likely been imposed”
against the University of Alabama’s football team if it were not for
“institutional cooperation” to stop the payments from boosters to
college athletes).

28.

See Joe Nocera, Here’s How to Pay Up Now, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2012,
32 (Magazine) (noting that premier college coaches can earn “as much
or more than a professional coach” and that, specifically, Ohio State
University football coach Urban Meyer makes an estimated $4 million
per year); see also Fred Frommer, Advocacy Group Says Top College
Athletes Worth Six Figures, ESPN.COM, Sept. 12, 2011,
http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/6962151/advocacy-groupsays-top-college-athletes-worth-six-figures (discussing a survey that
found even student-athletes that received the maximum amount of
financial aid permitted under the NCAA’s bylaws are often left “below
the poverty line”).
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amateurism bylaws serve as an impediment.29 For example, in June 2011,
seven Southeastern Conference football coaches proposed designating a
share of their multimillion-dollar salaries to establish stipends of $300
per game for their student-athletes.30 However, superiors at each
school nixed the stipend plan in fear of the NCAA’s rebuke.31
The NCAA’s continued failure to allow colleges to make
independent business decisions about student-athlete pay hurts not
only the student-athletes but also the college football consumers.32 For
example, if the seven Southeastern Conference colleges had not
quashed their coaches’ stipend plan, those colleges would have been
able to use the stipends to recruit better players—producing a
stronger on-field football product and thus leading to greater fan
satisfaction.33 Nevertheless, by complying with a zero salary cap, these
colleges succumbed to the will of the majority and surrendered the
opportunity to compete most effectively both on and off the field.34

29.

For further information on the NCAA amateurism bylaws and the
enforcement of these bylaws, see supra Part I.B.

30.

See Spurrier Proposes Paying Players, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE,
June 5, 2011, at D9 (describing how Spurrier, head coach of the South
Carolina Gamecocks, proposed a plan to pay football players $300 per
game out of his own salary).

31.

See generally NCAA Shelves $2,000 Athlete Stipend, ESPN.COM, (Dec.
16, 2011), http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/7357868/ncaaputs-2000-stipend-athletes-hold (expressing concern that paying stipends
to student-athletes would “violate the NCAA’s philosophy on amateur
sports”).

32.

Cf. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 107
(1984) (holding that “[a] restraint that has the effect of reducing the
importance of consumer preference in setting price and output is not
consistent with . . . antitrust law”).

33.

See Lee Goldman, Sports and Antitrust: Should College Students Be
Paid to Play?, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 206, 211 (1990) (noting that if
an individual NCAA member provides greater compensation to studentathletes
than
the
NCAA-permitted
amount,
“it
may
attract better athletes, larger attendance, more lucrative television
contracts, and greater national publicity”). But cf. Gary R. Roberts, The
NCAA, Antitrust, and Consumer Welfare, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2631, 2651
(1996) (“The extent to which a system of free-market bidding for
players [in college athletics] would thus reshuffle the allocation of
players among colleges is hard to determine, and it would be even
harder to ascertain the extent to which the reshuffled deck would
provide a better quality product for consumers.”).

34.

Cf. Goldman, supra note 33, at 226–27 (recognizing that a cap on
college athlete compensation prevents schools from competing for
student-athletes in a free market based on their internal resources).
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II. An Introduction to Section 1 of
the Sherman Act
The NCAA’s principle of amateurism is long embedded in the
history of college athletics; however, its concerted effort to destroy the
free market for recruiting student-athletes is subject to scrutiny under
section 1 of the Sherman Act.35 Indeed, the principle’s no-pay rules
can reasonably be interpreted as the very antithesis to the type of
competitive markets envisioned by drafters of the Sherman Act.36
A.

Overview

Section 1 of the Sherman Act, in pertinent part, states that
“[e]very contract, combination[,] . . . or conspiracy, in the restraint of
trade or commerce . . . is declared to be illegal.”37 This section of
antitrust law provides “a comprehensive charter of economic liberty
aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of
trade.”38 It rests on the basic belief that “unrestrained interaction of
competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic
resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality, and the greatest
material progress.”39
Read literally, section 1 of the Sherman Act would seem to
prohibit all commercial contracts.40 However, courts have interpreted
the act, in conjunction with preexisting common law, to prohibit only

35.

See Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, Atlantic Monthly,
Oct. 2011, at 84 (explaining that the NCAA has attempted to enshrine
amateur ideals into collegiate sports since its inception); see also Bd. of
Regents, 468 U.S. at 99 (1984) (“By participating in an association
which prevents member institutions from competing against each
other . . . the NCAA member institutions have created a horizontal
restraint—an agreement among competitors on the way in which they
will compete with one another. A restraint of this type has often been
held to be unreasonable as a matter of law.”).

36.

See discussion infra Part III.

37.

Sherman Act §§ 1–7, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006).

38.

N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958); see also Reiter v.
Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 342–43 (1979).

39.

Northern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 4; see also Baum Research & Dev. Co. v.
Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 31 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1021 (E.D. Mich. 1998)
(“The Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately
competition will produce not only lower prices, but also better goods
and services.” (quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435
U.S. 679, 695 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

40.

Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1304
(W.D. Okla. 1982) aff’d in part, remanded in part, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th
Cir. 1983), aff’d, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); see also Law v. NCAA, 902
F. Supp. 1394, 1402 (D. Kan. 1995).
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those contracts that “unreasonably” restrain trade.41 To determine
whether a restraint “unreasonably” restrains trade, a court will apply
a two-part test.42 First, the court will determine whether the restraint
involves “concerted action between two legally distinct economic
entities” in a manner that affects “trade or commerce among the
several states” (“threshold requirements”).43 If these threshold
requirements are met, the court will then determine whether the
alleged restraint unduly suppresses competition within any relevant
market (“competitive effects test”).44

41.

Bd. of Regents, 546 F. Supp. at 1304 (citing Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31 (1911)); see also Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d
1010, 1016 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Because nearly every contract that binds
the parties to an agreed course of conduct is a ‘restraint of trade’ of
some sort, the Supreme Court has limited the restrictions contained in
section 1 to bar only ‘unreasonable restraints of trade.’” (quoting NCAA
v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984))); Coll.
Athletic Placement Serv., Inc. v. NCAA, No. 74-1144, 1974 WL 998, at
*3 (D.N.J. Aug. 22, 1974) (reaching the same conclusion regarding
“unreasonable” restraints of trade).

42.

See Law, 134 F.3d at 1016 (describing this two-step test); cf. Marc
Edelman, Are Commissioner Suspensions Really Any Different from
Illegal Group Boycotts? Analyzing Whether the NFL Personal Conduct
Policy Illegally Restrains Trade, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 631, 640 (2009)
(describing a similar three-part test involving threshold issues, an
analysis of competitive effects, and finally the analysis of preemption
and other non-competition-based affirmative defenses).

43.

Primetime 24 Joint Venture v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 219 F.3d 92, 103
(2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Capital Imaging Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley Med.
Assocs., 996 F.2d 537, 542 (2d Cir. 1993)); see also Sherman Act §1,
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (requiring that, to be illegal, the contract,
combination, or conspiracy must be “in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States”); Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325
F. Supp. 1049, 1062 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (“Before a concerted refusal to
deal can be illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, two threshold
elements must be present: (1) there must be some effect on ‘trade or
commerce among the several States’, and (2) there must be sufficient
agreement to constitute a ‘contract, combination . . . or conspiracy.’”).

44.

See Edelman, supra note 42, at 646 (explaining that the court will find
a net anticompetitive effect “where the anticompetitive effects of a
particular agreement are greater than their pro-competitive benefits”);
see also Banks v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 850, 858 (N.D. Ind. 1990)
(“Whether a particular arrangement violates the Sherman Act depends
upon the arrangement’s effect upon competition in the relevant
marketplace.”).
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B.

Threshold Requirements

In assessing the threshold requirements of an antitrust challenge,
a court will often consider each requirement separately.45 To
determine whether a restraint involves the first threshold
requirement—“concerted action between two legally distinct economic
entities”46—a court will consider whether there is evidence of an
agreement, either written or implied, between entities that lack a
common objective.47 This requirement compels plaintiffs to show the
presence of an agreement that “deprives the marketplace of
independent centers of decisionmaking . . . and thus of actual and
potential competition.”48
Similarly, to ascertain whether a restraint affects the other
threshold requirement—“trade or commerce among the several
States”49—a court will determine whether the restraint involves “the
exchange or buying and selling of commodities especially on a large
scale involving transportation from place to place.”50 Under a modern
45.

See generally Edelman, supra note 42, at 642 (explaining that a
reviewing court begins “its analysis by determining whether [the] two
threshold issues are met”).

46.

Primetime, 219 F.3d at 103 (quoting Capital Imaging Assocs., 996 F.2d
at 542).

47.

See Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2212 (2010) (“The
relevant inquiry, therefore, is whether there is a ‘contract,
combination . . . or conspiracy’ amongst ‘separate economic actors
pursuing separate economic interests’ . . . .” (quoting Copperweld
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 773 (1984))); see
also Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 335 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding that
“[t]here is no question that all NCAA member schools have agreed to
abide by the Bylaws,” so “the first showing of an agreement or
contract is therefore not at issue in this case”); Hairston v. Pac. 10
Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1319 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that an
agreement among all of the colleges in the Pac-10 conference “fulfills
the ‘contract, combination, and conspiracy’ prong” (quoting NCAA v.
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 99 (1984))).

48.

American Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2212.

49.

Sherman Act §1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).

50.

Webster’s Third Int’l Dictionary 456 (3d ed. 1986); see also
Agnew, 683 F.3d at 338 (finding a commercial transaction to occur
between a student-athlete and his college where “the student-athlete
uses his athletic abilities on behalf of the university in exchange for an
athletic or academic education, room, and board”); Bassett v. NCAA,
528 F.3d 426, 433 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding a rule inhibiting NCAA
member schools from hiring coaches that had been previously sanctioned
by the NCAA to be “anti-commercial”); Worldwide Basketball & Sport
Tours, Inc. v. NCAA, 388 F.3d 955, 959 (6th Cir. 2004) (implying that
certain trade-association rules may be deemed noncommercial if they are
not based on business motives); Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1319 (agreeing
with the parties that the “agreement affects interstate commerce”).
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view, the actual amount of interstate activity, as compared to
intrastate activity, is irrelevant so long as “it is not insubstantial.”51
Thus, “almost every activity from which [an] actor anticipates
economic gain” will be found to affect interstate commerce.52
C.

Competitive Effects Analysis

Presuming that both threshold requirements are met, a court will
next review the restraint’s competitive effects by applying one of
three sanctioned tests: (1) per se, (2) rule of reason, or (3) quick-look.
On one end of the spectrum, if a restraint is “so nefarious” that there
is high probability that it lacks any redeeming value, a court will
apply the per se test.53 The per se test presumes that a restraint
suppresses competition without engaging in any further inquiry.54
Thus, a court will declare the restraint to be illegal unless a special
antitrust exemption applies.55
On the other end of the spectrum, if a court, upon first
impression, believes that a restraint is likely to have some competitive
benefit, it will instead apply the rule of reason test.56 The rule of
51.

Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1150 (5th Cir. 1977) (citing United
States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 225–26 (1947)).

52.

IA Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law
¶ 260b, at 250 (2d ed. 2000).

53.

Marc Edelman, Upon Further Review: Will the NFL’s Trademark
Licensing Practices Survive Full Antitrust Scrutiny? The Remand of
American Needle v. Nat’l Football League, 16 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN.
183, 197 (2011); see also State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997)
(“Some types of restraints . . . have such predictable and pernicious
anticompetitive effect, and such limited potential for procompetitive
benefit, that they are deemed unlawful per se.”); Geneva Pharms. Tech.
Corp. v. Barr Labs, Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 506 (2d Cir. 2004) (explaining
that conduct is per se illegal if it falls within “the narrow range of
behavior that is considered so plainly anti-competitive and so lacking in
redeeming pro-competitive value that it is ‘presumed illegal without any
further examination’” (quoting Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 8
(1979))).

54.

See Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1108 (7th Cir.
1984) (“It is only when the plaintiff adequately states a per se violation
of § 1 of the Sherman Act that an allegation of anticompetitive effects is
not required.”).

55.

Cf. Marc Edelman & Brian Doyle, Antitrust and “Free Movement”
Risks of Expanding U.S. Professional Sports Leagues into Europe, 29
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 403, 415 (2009) (“In the context of professional
sports . . . the two most applicable defenses or exemptions to Section 1
of the Sherman Act are the statutory labor exemption and the nonstatutory labor exemption.”).

56.

See Edelman, supra note 53, at 198 (noting that the rule of reason test
is applied when courts believe an arrangement is likely to have
redeeming benefits).
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reason test “distinguishes between restraints with anticompetitive
effect that are harmful to the consumer and restraints stimulating
competition that are in the consumer’s best interest.”57 It requires
investigating every aspect of a restraint, including whether the parties
to the restraint had the power to control any relevant market
(“market power”), whether the restraint encourages or suppresses
competition, and whether the restraint caused the marketplace
“antitrust harm.”58
Finally, in the third set of circumstances, a court may elect to
perform an “abbreviated or quick-look rule of reason analysis.”59
Under this third test, a court will probe into certain aspects of a
restraint while relying on its initial presumptions about others.60 Most
courts that apply the quick-look test do so in favor of the plaintiff
based on a preliminary finding of anticompetitive effects, relieving the
burden of establishing market power and shifting the burden to the
defendant to provide justification.61 Nevertheless, two recent antitrust
57.

Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886
(2007).

58.

See Edelman, supra note 53, at 198–99; see also Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984) (describing the rule
of reason as “an inquiry into market power and market structure”);
Worldwide Basketball & Sport Tours, Inc. v. NCAA, 388 F.3d 955, 959
(6th Cir. 2004) (explaining that “[u]nder the rule of reason analysis, the
plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the conduct complained of
produces significant anticompetitive effects within the relevant product
and geographic markets” (quoting NHL Players’ Ass’n v. Plymouth
Whalers Hockey Club, 325 F.3d 712, 718 (6th Cir. 2003))); cf. Banks v.
NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1087–88 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting that, with
respect to the requirement of showing antitrust harm, “[t]he purpose of
the Sherman Act is to rectify the injury to consumers caused by
diminished competition” and “not only an injury to [one]self” (quoting
Car Carriers, 745 F.2d at 1107–08)).

59.

See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 757 (1999) (defining the
abbreviated or “quick look” rule of reason test as one that should be
used “when an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of
economics could conclude that the arrangements in question have an
anticompetitive effect on customers and markets”); see also Edelman,
supra note 53, at 197 (“In the middle of the spectrum, where an
arrangement seems less nefarious, a court may instead apply the ‘quick
look’ test . . . .”).

60.

See Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290,
294 (2d Cir. 2008) (upholding the district court’s finding that a quicklook analysis—which could have relieved the evidentiary burden for
establishing the issues of market power and actual adverse effect on
competition—did not apply).

61.

See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109–13
(1984) (holding that while market power was evident as a matter of fact
without extensive analysis, as a matter of law, no such market analysis
was required because the anticompetitive effects were clearly
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decisions have found that courts may also adopt the quick-look test in
favor of defendants if the alleged restraint is “essential if the product
is to be available at all.”62

III. Analyzing the NCAA’s No-Pay Rules Under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act
There are two formidable ways by which a plaintiff could
challenge the NCAA’s no-pay rules under section 1 of the Sherman
Act. The first is to contend that the no-pay rules represent a form of
wage fixing that harms not only the market for student-athlete
services but also the quality of college sports’ on-field product. The
second is to argue that the NCAA rules constitute an illegal group
boycott of those colleges that would otherwise compete in a free
market to recruit student-athletes.
Under both legal theories, courts would likely review the NCAA’s
no-pay rules under the full rule of reason test because NCAA
members “share an interest in making the entire league successful and
profitable” and thus collectively benefit from cooperating on “the
production and scheduling of games.”63 Under the wage-fixing theory,
student-athletes would be the ideal plaintiffs to challenge the NCAA’s
restraints; meanwhile, under the group-boycott theory, the ideal
plaintiff would be an NCAA member.

demonstrated and thus required “some competitive justification” from
the defendant); see also Law v. NCAA, 902 F. Supp. 1394, 1405 (D.
Kan. 1995) (“[B]ecause adverse effects on competition are apparent, the
court does not require proof of market power, and instead moves
directly to an analysis of the defendant’s proffered competitive
justifications for the restraint.”), aff’d, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998).
62.

Laumann v. NHL, 907 F. Supp. 2d 465, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting
Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010); Agnew v. NCAA, 683
F.3d 328, 341 (7th Cir. 2012) (explaining that certain joint venture
conduct that is necessary for the joint venture to exist in the first place
is “presumptively procompetitive”).

63.

American Needle, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2216 (2010); see also Texaco, Inc. v.
Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 1, 5 (2006) (“It is not per se illegal under § 1 of the
Sherman Act for a lawful, economically integrated joint venture to set
the prices at which it sells its products.”); Justice v. NCAA, 577 F.
Supp. 356, 380 (D. Ariz. 1983) (noting that “[a] clear trend has emerged
in recent years under which courts have been extremely reluctant to
subject the rules and regulations of sports organizations to the group
boycott per se analysis”). But see Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 108 (1984)
(applying the quick-look test to review of the NCAA’s television
broadcast practices).
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A. Challenging the NCAA’s No-Pay Rules As Illegal
Wage-Fixing Restraints

The argument that the NCAA’s no-pay rules constitute illegal
wage fixing is best supported by precedent from the Supreme Court
and the Tenth Circuit. As cases in these courts explain, wage fixing
involves any agreement by two or more employers to set the
compensation rate of workers at a pre-specified amount.64 Generally,
courts find wage fixing to be illegal not only because it harms workers
but also because it injures the competitive marketplace by driving
workers away from their current line of employment and into another
field where their work product is less valuable to society.65
Furthermore, courts generally recognize that an agreement to fix
employee wages outside the scope of a collective bargaining agreement
illegally “restrain[s] mobility on the part of employees who would
otherwise have the opportunity, in a competitive market for services,
to transfer to higher paid opportunities [that otherwise would be]
offered by others.”66
Applying these well-established principles, the Tenth Circuit held
in Law v. NCAA67 that the NCAA’s attempt to cap assistant coaches’
salaries was illegal because it depressed coaches’ compensation
without promoting any legitimate antitrust goal.68 The court
concluded that it was irrelevant whether the NCAA salary restraint
opened up coaching opportunities for newer coaches because this
rationale related entirely to social preferences that are divorced from

64.

John H. Johnson, Jess David & Paul A. Torelli, Empirical Evidence and
Class Certification in Labor Market Antitrust Cases, 25 ANTITRUST 60,
63 (2010).

65.

See, e.g., Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1061–62 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (explaining that “[a]thletic prowess is, of course, a unique and
highly specialized resource, of precisely the genre vulnerable to
monopsony manipulation” and if sports “team owners join together to
suppress the price of athletic services through monopsony practices,
most athletes will not be able to switch profitably to other lines of
work,” thus creating a “labor market for professional athletes’
services . . . where there is real potential for anticompetitive
monopsonistic practices”); cf. Michael G. Langan, Comment, Why a
Fixed Salary for Developmental Squad Players Does Not Hurt the Game:
Defending the Decision Not to Argue Consumer Injury in Brown v. Pro
Football, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 559, 560 (1997) (discussing an
argument by Penn State Law School sports and antitrust law professor
Stephen F. Ross that explains why a wage-fixing restraint in the context
of a sports injury can lead to widespread consumer harm).

66.

See Cordova v. Bache & Co., 321 F. Supp. 600, 606–07 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).

67.

134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998).

68.

Id. at 1020.
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the notion of an open, competitive marketplace.69 Likewise, the court
rejected the argument that a salary cap was beneficial to the free
market because it would cut all NCAA members’ costs: “cost-cutting
by itself is not a valid procompetitive justification” and “[i]f it were,
any group of competing buyers [would then be allowed to] agree on
maximum prices.”70
There is, of course, one important distinction between the court’s
holding in Law and a theoretical antitrust challenge posited against
the NCAA’s student-athlete no-pay rules: unlike assistant coaches,
student-athletes have not traditionally been defined as employees, so
the collective determination of their pay has not traditionally been
construed as wage fixing.71 Nevertheless, any empirical observation of
student-athletes’ daily activities shows that student-athletes are
closely akin in practice to traditional workers.72 For example, “a selfstudy performed by the NCAA in 2011” found that “Division I
[college] football players [devoted] an average of 43.3 hours per week
to their sport”—more time than they spent on academic activities,
and more than a typical U.S. worker spends on his profession.73 In
addition, student-athletes seem to meet the Internal Revenue
Service’s multifactor test for employment because NCAA coaching
staffs exercise year-round behavioral controls over student-athletes
and impose strict limits on their outside financial activities.74
Furthermore, in the context of workers’ compensation law, at least
69.

Id. at 1021–22 (“While opening up coaching positions for younger people
may have social value apart from its affect [sic] on competition, we may
not consider such values unless they impact upon competition.”).

70.

Id. at 1022 (explaining further that setting maximum prices generally
“reduces the incentive among suppliers to improve their products” in
the context of college basketball coaches, and it would similarly create
“less incentive to improve their performance if their salaries are
capped”). Also, the court rejected the argument that the cap on certain
coaches’ salaries was needed to maintain competitive balance among
teams because, “[w]hile the REC [Restricted Earnings Coach] Rule
[would] equalize the salaries paid to entry-level Division I coaches, it is
not clear the REC Rule [would] equalize the experience level of such
coaches” nor level the cost structure overall of operating college sport.
Id. at 1024.

71.

See generally Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The
Myth of the Student-Athlete: The College Athlete As Employee,
81 WASH. L. REV. 71, 129 (2006) (highlighting the argument made by
some that student-athletes cannot be victims of wage fixing because
they are not employees).

72.

Id.

73.

Michael H. LeRoy, An Invisible Union for an Invisible Labor Market:
College Football and the Union Substitution Effect, 2012 WIS. L. REV.
1077, 1099 (2012).

74.

Id. at 1094–95.
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one court has issued an award to a student-athlete—thus treating him
as a de facto employee.75
All of these factors combine to significantly rebut the
longstanding legal fiction advanced by the NCAA that studentathletes are foremost students and not workers. Indeed, there is even
some evidence that this legal fiction was created by the NCAA for the
specific purpose of trying to avoid antitrust scrutiny.76 Thus, it would
be the most bizarre of loopholes to allow the NCAA to evade
antitrust scrutiny simply by applying a dubious label to their business
practices.77
B.

Challenging the NCAA’s No-Pay Rules As an Illegal Group Boycott

There is also a strong argument that the NCAA’s no-pay rules
constitute an illegal group boycott against colleges that would
otherwise seek to pay their student-athletes.78 In contrast to the wagefixing argument, the group-boycott argument is strongest if brought
by an NCAA member, given the well-established precedent that
members of private associations have antitrust standing to sue their
associations.79

75.

See id. at 1103 (citing Univ. of Denver v. Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423 (Colo.
1953)) (holding that a student-athlete’s award of worker’s compensation
benefits was proper because the injuries to his back sustained during
football practice arose out of and in the course of employment).

76.

See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 71, at 74 (arguing that the
NCAA self-coined the term “student-athlete” to perpetuate a myth of
amateurism and “obtain the astonishing pecuniary gain and related
benefits of the athletes’ talents, time, and energy”).

77.

See generally Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2213 (2010)
(“An ongoing § 1 violation cannot evade § 1 scrutiny simply by giving
the ongoing violation a name and label.”).

78.

Cf. Edelman, supra note 5, at 871 (“[R]ules limiting student-athlete wages
operate as a restraint of trade on a relevant commercial market.”).

79.

The added challenge for a student-athlete bringing a group boycott
claim against the NCAA is based on the issue of standing—the
requirement that a plaintiff suffer a loss or prospective loss that is
related to one’s business or property. In Justice v. NCAA, the District
of Arizona found that a group of college football players could not state
an antitrust claim against the NCAA for its rendering of the University
of Arizona ineligible for postseason competition because “there are
simply too many factors other than the NCAA sanctions and the alleged
injury for [the court] to find that a proximate relationship exists.”
Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 378 (D. Ariz. 1983). But a similar
group boycott claim would not be nearly as difficult if brought by an
NCAA member because the threat of sanction by the NCAA would
cause a nearly certain loss of sports-related revenues. See, e.g., NCAA v.
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (finding for the
plaintiffs in a group boycott claim brought by two members of the NCAA).
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1.

The Seminal Case: NCAA v. Board of Regents

The case most directly on point for finding the NCAA’s no-pay
rules to function as an illegal group boycott is the Supreme Court’s
1984 decision, NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of
Oklahoma.80 There, the Court held that limiting the number of games
that an NCAA member may broadcast on television violated section 1
of the Sherman Act because it “eliminate[d] competitors from the
[broadcast television] market.”81 The Court further implied that any
attempt to ban an NCAA member for refusing to comply with its
television bylaws was tantamount to an illegal group boycott because
it prevented NCAA membership for those colleges seeking to compete
in the free market for broadcast revenues.82
The litigation in Board of Regents was long and complex, lasting
for more than three years. At the district court level, the court held
that the NCAA’s television bylaws represented an illegal restraint on
output, and that the NCAA, in its allocation of television rights,
illegally “maintain[ed] mechanisms for punishing cartel members who
[sought] to stray from these production quotas.”83 The Tenth Circuit
affirmed, concurring that “[t]he television plan at issue . . . restrict[ed]
the plaintiffs’ revenues, market share, and output,”84 and further
noting that “the television [plan’s] . . . threat of expulsion and
boycott [are] sanctions which clearly have anticompetitive

80.

468 U.S. 85 (1984).

81.

Id. at 108. Along those same lines, the Supreme Court found that the
NCAA television policy had no offsetting procompetitive benefit because
it neither increased the output of televised games nor reduced the price
of televised games. Id. at 113.

82.

See id. at 106 (explaining that “as a practical matter all member
institutions need NCAA approval” to function).

83.

See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276,
1301 (W.D. Okla. 1982), aff’d in part, remanded in part, 707 F.2d 1147
(10th Cir. 1983), aff’d, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). Furthermore, the district
court found each of the other elements required under a full rule of
reason analysis were also met. It concluded that the Universities of
Oklahoma and Georgia suffered “antitrust harm” because they were able
to show the likelihood of lost revenues due to the television broadcast
restraints. See id. at 1301–02 (concluding that such injuries are “direct
and substantial, and not indirect or derivative of injury alleged to have
been suffered by the public at large”). Meanwhile, it held that the
NCAA exercised “market power” in both a relevant market for college
football television broadcasts and the competition in college sports
because, “[a]s a practical matter, membership in the NCAA is a
prerequisite for institutions wishing to sponsor a major, well-rounded
athletic program.” See id. at 1288.

84.

Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147, 1151
(10th Cir. 1983).
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potential.”85 Thus, even if the NCAA restraint had not affected
output, the appellate court still would have found the threat of
expelling noncomplying members to require careful scrutiny under a
full rule of reason analysis.86
Thereafter, the Supreme Court similarly ruled that the NCAA’s
television plan was illegal because it “eliminates competitors from the
market, since only those broadcasters able to bid on television rights
covering the entire NCAA can compete.”87 In addition, the Court
explained that “when there is an agreement in terms of price or
output, ‘no elaborate industry analysis is needed to demonstrate the
anticompetitive characteristics of such agreement.’”88
2.

Other Instructive Supreme Court Opinions

Although the Supreme Court’s ruling in Board of Regents focused
mostly on output restraints, several other Supreme Court decisions
unrelated to college sports touch more directly on the conclusion that
trade associations may not serve as “extra-judicial tribunals.”89 For
instance, in Fashion Originators Guild of America v. Federal Trade
Commission,90 the Supreme Court affirmed a Federal Trade
Commission decree that enjoined members of a fashion trade
association from combining “among themselves to combat
and . . . destroy all competition from the sale of garments which are
copies of their ‘original creators.’”91 In finding the trade association’s
self-governance to be illegal, the Court explained that members of a
trade association may not collectively agree to boycott other members
for failing to follow association rules, nor may they issue “heavy fines”

85.

Id. at 1161 (finding that plaintiffs’ claim of an output restraint was per
se illegal, and their group boycott claim was subject to the full rule of
reason inquiry).

86.

See id.

87.

NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 108 (1984).
Although the Supreme Court believed the restraint could not be deemed
illegal under a mere per se test, it found the district court sufficiently
analyzed the restraint under its “quick look” review. Id.

88.

Id. at 109 (quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435
U.S. 679, 692 (1978)).

89.

Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 465
(1941) (discussing how such internal self-governance impermissibly
“trenches upon the power of the national legislature and violates the
statute” (quoting Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S.
211, 242 (1899))).

90.

312 U.S. 457 (1941).

91.

Id. at 461.
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on those competitors that are unwilling to go along with the
majority’s view.92
Similarly, in Anderson v. Shipowners’ Association of Pacific
Coast,93 the Supreme Court held it was illegal for a trade association
that owned and operated almost all of the American merchant vessels
along the Pacific Coast to “surrender[ ] . . . freedom of action in the
matter of employing seamen and agree[ ] to abide by the will of the
associations.”94 There, the Court presumed that any combination
among competitors to govern the terms of employment for an entire
industry violated the Sherman Act.95
The guiding principles of both Fashion Originators and Anderson
further call into doubt the NCAA’s attempt to impose a selfregulatory regime that mandates members not pay their studentathletes. This is because, much like the earlier self-governance regimes
that the Supreme Court rejected as illegal, the NCAA controls nearly
all of the businesses in its trade—making a member’s ban from the
association a significant hardship.96 In addition, as one district court
opinion has explained, “it is clear from the evidence that an
institution which withdraws or is expelled from the NCAA could no
longer operate a fully-rounded intercollegiate athletic program.”97
Because “[n]on-member institutions could not compete in the
prestigious NCAA championship events . . . [t]hey would therefore be
unable to recruit quality athletes into their programs.”98 Thus, “[a]s a
practical matter, membership in the NCAA is a prerequisite for
institutions wishing to sponsor a major, well-rounded athletic
program.”99
Another line of Supreme Court decisions outlaws trade
associations from enforcing “absolute ban[s] on competitive
bidding”—an additional aspect of the NCAA’s group boycott.100 For
92.

Id. at 463–65.

93.

272 U.S. 359 (1926).

94.

Id. at 364–65.

95.

See id. at 362–65.

96.

See generally Jeffrey L. Kessler, Tournament Has Become March
Monopoly Madness, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 2004, at 9 (comparing the
NCAA’s control of the college basketball market to “a 7-foot center
playing in a fixed game in which no one else is allowed to be taller than
6 feet”).

97.

Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1288
(W.D. Okla. 1982), aff’d in part, remanded in part, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th
Cir. 1983), aff’d, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).

98.

Id.

99.

Id. (emphasis added).

100. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692–93
(1978) (adopting the district court’s finding that such a ban “‘impedes
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example, in National Society of Professional Engineers v. United
States,101 the Supreme Court nullified an engineering trade
association’s canon of ethics that prevented members from securing
contracts by offering a lower price than their competitors for a given
job.102 Noting that “[t]he Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment
that ultimately competition will produce not only lower prices, but
also better goods and services,” the Court explained that any
attempts to prevent companies from competing on the attribute of
price was unreasonable.103 Moreover, the Court found it entirely
irrelevant that the engineering firms were still able to compete on
other factors given that only one important factor (price) had been
removed.104
This conclusion, expressed so cogently by the Supreme Court in
Professional Engineers, would lead to the same inevitable conclusion
regarding the NCAA’s principle of amateurism: that it is illegal
because it prevents its members from engaging in competitive
“bidding” to recruit student-athletes.105 Furthermore, the fact that
Professional Engineers involved the selling of services—compared to
the NCAA’s no-pay rules, which affect the purchase of services—
makes no difference under the law because, from an economic
perspective, monopoly and monopsony markets lead to similar risks of
consumer harm.106

the ordinary give and take of the market place’ and . . . deprives . . .
customer[s] of ‘the ability to utilize and compare prices in selecting
engineering services’” (quoting 404 F. Supp. 457, 460 (D.D.C. 1975))).
101. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
102. Id. at 692–93.
103. Id. at 695.
104. See id. at 684, 693 (noting that the society’s preference to have
customers hire engineers on the basis of background and reputation, not
price, was nothing more than restraint in violation of § 1).
105. Id. (rejecting the canon of ethics prohibiting competitive bidding
because it was not justified under the Sherman Act).
106. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549
U.S. 312, 321 (2007) (“The kinship between monopoly and monopsony
suggests that similar legal standards should apply to claims of
monopolization and to claims of monopsonization.”); see also Brown v.
Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1061–62 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (discussing
the harms of wage fixing in a monopsony market as being much the
same as price fixing in a monopoly market); cf. Leroy, supra note 73, at
1087 (explaining that “[w]hile monopoly controls pricing by limiting
competition to sell a product or a service, a monopsony controls pricing
by limiting purchasing competition”).
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IV. Why Lower Court Decisions Finding the NCAA’s
Eligibility Rules to Be Noncommercial Are Either
Inapposite or Wrongly Decided
Despite the favorable Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent
discussed in Part III, not all of today’s case law clearly supports
finding the NCAA’s no-pay rules illegal. Indeed, eight lower courts
within the First, Third, and Sixth Circuits have contrarily held that
the NCAA’s “eligibility” rules are exempt from antitrust scrutiny
because these rules do not affect “trade or commerce” and thus fail to
meet one of the threshold requirements for antitrust scrutiny.107 These
decisions, however, rely on inaccurate factual presumptions about the
NCAA and outdated interpretations of antitrust law that have since
been rejected by the Supreme Court. Thus, although these decisions
survive as a deviant strain of precedent within three federal circuits, they
cannot survive the Supreme Court’s current antitrust jurisprudence.
A.

A Brief Discussion of the Eight Lower Court Decisions Finding the
NCAA Eligibility Rules to Be Noncommercial

The first lower court to hold the NCAA’s eligibility rules
noncommercial and thus exempt from antitrust scrutiny was the
District of New Jersey in its 1974 ruling, College Athletic Placement
Service, Inc. v. NCAA.108 There, the plaintiff—a company that helped
young athletes find college scholarships—brought suit to enjoin the
NCAA from enforcing an amateurism bylaw that prevented studentathletes from paying companies that assisted with the finding of
scholarship opportunities.109 Without ruling directly on the
competitive merits, the court held that the legal challenge presented
in the case did not come within the purview of the Sherman Act
because it served merely to “preserv[e] the educational standards in
its member institutions.”110 The court relied primarily on an earlier
decision from the First Circuit—Marjorie Webster Junior College,
Inc. v. Middle States Association of Colleges111—which held that a
college’s failure to obtain accreditation from a nonprofit association

107. Sherman Act §§ 1–7, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006). Specifically, “[e]very
contract, combination in form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce . . . is declared illegal.” Id. at § 3
(emphasis added).
108. No. 74-1144, 1974 WL 998 (D.N.J. Aug. 22, 1974).
109. Id. at *1.
110. Id. at *4.
111. 432 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1970).
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did not give rise to antitrust harm because “denial of accreditation
[was] not tantamount to exclusion . . . from operating successfully.”112
The following year, the District of Massachusetts decided a
similar case, Jones v. NCAA,113 also citing Marjorie Webster to
support finding an NCAA bylaw exempt from antitrust scrutiny.114
The dispute in Jones related to whether the NCAA could deem a
college hockey player ineligible for competition based on the player’s
previous receipt of an athletic stipend.115 The court concluded that the
plaintiff could not challenge the NCAA’s rule banning such a player
because the plaintiff did not show how “the actions of the [NCAA] in
setting eligibility guidelines ha[d] any nexus to commercial or business
activities in which the defendant might engage.”116 In addition, the
court noted that even if the claim was not barred on noncommercial
grounds, the NCAA still did not act with sufficient “scienter” to
violate antitrust law.117
Thereafter in Gaines v. NCAA,118 the Middle District of
Tennessee similarly held that a plaintiff wishing to return to college
football after entering the NFL draft could not bring an antitrust
challenge against the NCAA.119 The Gaines decision was reached six
years after the Supreme Court ruled favorably for the plaintiffs in
Board of Regents.120 Nevertheless, the court differentiated the case by
noting a legal difference “between the NCAA’s efforts to restrict the
112. Id. at 656. Nevertheless, the proposition relied on in Marjorie Webster
Junior College was decidedly different from that in College Athletic
Placement Service, as the latter restraint did far more than just cause
the plaintiffs to suffer social stigma; it entirely precluded the plaintiffs
from maintaining their business relationships. See Coll. Athletic
Placement Serv., 1974 WL 998, at *2 (describing a letter from the
NCAA to the College Athletic Placement Service indicating the intent
to declare any student-athlete ineligible based on their parents’ decision
to contract with the College Athletic Placement Service).
113. 392 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1975).
114. Id. at 303.
115. See id. at 296–98.
116. Id. at 303.
117. Id. at 304.
118. 746 F. Supp. 738 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
119. Id. at 740 (discussing Vanderbilt University football player Bradford L.
Gaines’s challenge to an NCAA bylaw that revokes an athlete’s amateur
status when he enters a professional draft or enters into an agreement
with an agent to negotiate a professional contract). Perhaps due to poor
lawyering, Gaines’s antitrust challenge to the NCAA bylaws was
brought exclusively under section 2 of the Sherman Act, which relates to
monopolization, rather than under section 1 of the Sherman Act, which
relates to collusion. See id. at 741.
120. Id.; NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
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televising of college football games and the NCAA’s efforts to
maintain
a
discernible
line
between
amateurism
and
professionalism.”121 Thus, the court adopted a bifurcated test to
determine whether NCAA conduct affects interstate commerce,
placing “business rules” (such as the television policy) on one side of
an imaginary line and “eligibility rules” (such as those related to
amateurism) on the other side.122
Then in 1998, the Third Circuit formally adopted Gaines’s
bifurcated test for NCAA commerciality in another case, Smith v.
NCAA.123 Smith involved a plaintiff’s challenge to an NCAA bylaw
that prohibited a student-athlete from participating in intercollegiate
athletics while attending a graduate school different from the one
where she attended college.124 Citing College Athletic Placement
Services, Jones, and Gaines, the court found this particular bylaw
immune from competitive scrutiny because “many district courts have
[already] held that the Sherman Act does not apply to the NCAA’s
promulgation and enforcement of eligibility requirements.”125
After Smith, “[t]he parade marched on” with two other Third
Circuit rulings that found the NCAA’s eligibility rules to be
noncommercial and thus exempt from review.126 In Bowers v.
NCAA,127 the District of New Jersey held that the NCAA bylaws that
determine academic eligibility lie outside the Sherman Act’s reach
because Third Circuit precedent indicated that those bylaws are “not

121. Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 743. The court further proclaimed that, even
though the Supreme Court never explicitly stated in Board of Regents
that eligibility rules were noncommercial, its limited citation to Jones v.
NCAA was reason enough for courts to continue treating Jones as good
law. Id. (“Although the U.S. Supreme Court did not state that
eligibility rules were not subject to antitrust scrutiny, it cited a case
with approval, Jones v. NCAA, . . . which stated exactly that.”)
(citation omitted).
122. See id. at 747 (“The Supreme Court distinguished the NCAA television
restrictions, which it invalidated under § 1, from ‘most of the regulatory
controls of the NCAA [which] are justifiable means of fostering
competition among amateur teams and therefore procompetitive because
they enhance public interest in intercollegiate athletics.’” (alteration in
original) (citing Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117 (1984))).
123. Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 1998) (agreeing with the
Gaines court and others “that the eligibility rules are not related to the
NCAA’s commercial or business activities”), vacated and remanded on
different grounds, 525 U.S. 459 (1999).
124. Id. at 183.
125. Id. at 185.
126. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 278 (1972).
127. 9 F. Supp. 2d 460 (D.N.J. 1998).
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related to the NCAA’s commercial or business activities.”128 Likewise,
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held in Pocono Invitational
Sports Camps v. NCAA129 that an NCAA bylaw allowing Division I
coaches to evaluate high school basketball players only at certified
camps did not violate antitrust law because “[t]he plaintiff [did not]
show that the challenged restraint involved ‘trade or commerce.’”130
Finally and most recently in Bassett v. NCAA,131 the Sixth
Circuit followed the Third Circuit’s lead when it adopted a bifurcated
test for evaluating whether NCAA conduct is sufficiently commercial
to fall within the scope of the Sherman Act.132 The dispute in Bassett
specifically involved the legality of an NCAA mandate requiring that
any college wishing to hire a coach who previously engaged in
recruiting violations to first receive permission from the NCAA
Committee on Infractions.133 Ultimately, the court found the rule was
noncommercial, even though the court acknowledged that the NCAA
itself was a commercial actor.134 The court proceeded to describe the
NCAA coaching restraint as “anti-commercial” because, if not for the
rule, any NCAA member that wanted to hire a coach who had
engaged in previous NCAA recruiting infractions could obtain “a
decided competitive advantage in recruiting and retaining highly
prized student athletes.”135
B.

Why Each of These Eight Cases Was Wrongly Decided

In a vacuum, each of these eight decisions seems to present a
strong basis for finding the NCAA’s no-pay rules to be noncommercial
(or, as Bassett would argue, anti-commercial) and thus valid under
section 1 of the Sherman Act. Nevertheless, each of these decisions
suffers from at least one, if not multiple, defects in its analysis.
The first major defect with the above decisions arises from the
premise first adopted in College Athletic Placement Service that the
NCAA is noncommercial based on its status as an association

128. Id. at 497 (quoting Smith, 139 F.3d at 185–86) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
129. 317 F. Supp. 2d 569 (E.D. Penn. 2004).
130. Id. at 580.
131. 528 F.3d 426 (6th Cir. 2008).
132. See id. at 435 (noting that the restraint alleged in the case involved the
group boycott of Bassett arising from NCAA-imposed sanctions).
133. Id. at 429.
134. See id. at 433.
135. See id.
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involved in higher education.136 However, at the time College Athletic
Placement Service was decided, this issue was not well settled.137
Indeed, it was not until the very next year that the Supreme
Court held in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar138 that “[t]he nature of
an occupation, standing alone, does not provide sanctuary from the
Sherman Act.”139 Thus, the Court’s decision in Goldfarb implicitly
overruled College Athletic Placement Service by confirming that “the
exchange of [a] service for money is [always] ‘commerce’ in the most
common usage of that word”—even if the service involved a learned
profession.140 Thereafter in Board of Regents, the Supreme Court
identified the NCAA’s restraint on television broadcasts as being
commercial without even addressing the issue, seemingly bringing
further closure to any argument that these associations involved in
higher education are innately noncommercial.141
Another notable defect with many of these rulings is that they
cite Jones v. NCAA142—a case in which the court not only ruled in
favor of the NCAA based on the rejected educational exception but
also based on the NCAA’s purported lack of “scienter.”143
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has never found lack of “scienter” to
be a factor precluding an antitrust inquiry on the merits. To the
contrary, the Supreme Court has long endorsed the principle that
“[n]either the fact that [a] conspiracy may be intended to promote the

136. Coll. Athletic Placement Serv., Inc. v. NCAA, No. 74-1144, 1974 WL
998, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 22, 1974).
137. Cf. id. at *5 (“It is possible to conceive of restrictions on eligibility for
accreditation that could have little other than a commercial motive; and
as such, antitrust policy would presumably be applicable.”).
138. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
139. Id. at 787 (citing Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 7 (1945)).
140. Id.; see also Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1148–49 (5th Cir.
1997) (explaining that a close reading of Goldfarb negates the finding
that the NCAA is somehow exempt from antitrust law under a special
educational exception). As one appellate court has since explained,
although Goldfarb specifically rejected the claim that lawyers were
exempt from antitrust law as a special “learned profession,” the Court’s
holding would logically extend to the other purported learned
professions in which profits are made, such as college sports. Id. at 1149
n.14 (citing Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 788).
141. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 102
(1984).
142. 392 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1975).
143. See id. at 303–04.
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public welfare, or that of the industry . . . is sufficient [grounds] to
avoid the penalties of the Sherman Act.”144
A third defect with many of these cases is that they interpret the
threshold issue of “interstate commerce” based on a particular bylaw
rather than the NCAA’s overall business activities. However, the
Supreme Court explained in McLain v. Real Estate Board of New
Orleans, Inc.145 that the only thing a plaintiff must demonstrate to
meet the threshold issue of “interstate commerce” is a “substantial
effect on interstate commerce generated by [a defendant’s general
business activities].”146 Thus, the bylaw-specific evaluation of the
NCAA’s conduct has been flatly rejected.147
Moreover, from a factual perspective, many of these cases rely on
faulty presumptions about the NCAA. For example, many of the
aforementioned decisions imply that college athletics operate just like
other educational programs.148 But contrary to all other educational
programs, “intercollegiate athletics in its management is clearly
business, and big business at that.”149 For example, in 2010, a twelveteam athletic conference collected more than $1 billion in athletic
receipts.150 That same year, CBS paid more than $750 million to
144. Am. Med. Ass’n v. United States, 130 F.2d 233, 249 (D.C. Cir. 1942)
(citations omitted), aff’d, 317 U.S. 519 (1943); see also Nat’l Soc’y of
Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695–96 (1978).
145. 444 U.S. 232 (1980).
146. See id. at 242–43 (holding with regard to “respondents’ brokerage
activity” and rejecting the contention that the plaintiffs were required
to make a “more particularized showing” as to “the alleged conspiracy
to fix commission rates, or . . . other aspects of respondents’ activity”)
While the disputed issue in McLain primarily related to the “interstate”
aspect rather than the “commerce” aspect of “interstate commerce,” the
inquiry was nevertheless performed together, leading to the logical result
that the court intended a review of both components in the gestalt
rather than based on just a single bylaw. See id.
147. Id. (“If establishing jurisdiction required a showing that the unlawful
conduct itself had an effect on interstate commerce, jurisdiction would
be defeated by a demonstration that the alleged restraint failed to have
its intended anticompetitive effect. This is not the rule of our cases.”).
148. See, e.g., Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295, 303–04 (D. Mass. 1977)
(describing intercollegiate hockey as an educational program in a major
university).
149. Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1150 (5th Cir. 1977); see also Bd.
of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1288–89
(W.D. Okla. 1982) (“[I]t is cavil to suggest that college football, or indeed
higher education itself, is not a business.”), aff’d in part, remanded in
part, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), aff’d, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
150. See Branch, supra note 35, at 82 (explaining that in 2010, the “footballcrazed” Southeastern Conference became the first college athletic
conference to collect more than $1 billion in revenues, and the Big Ten
Conference trailed closely behind at $905 million).
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purchase the television broadcast rights to the NCAA men’s
basketball tournament.151 Meanwhile, an increasing number of college
athletic departments receive millions of dollars per year from selling
their stadium advertising rights, selling advertising space on players’
equipment, and using players’ names in licensed videogames.152 All of
these factors clearly indicate that college athletics has become “big
business” and, by all accounts, a commercial actor.153
Finally, also as a factual matter, many of the rulings that have
found the NCAA to be noncommercial turn for support to language in
the NCAA’s own bylaws denoting the association’s purported amateur
status. However, any reliance on the NCAA’s own bylaws leads to a
misleading result. As the Supreme Court has previously noted, “[a]n
ongoing § 1 violation cannot evade § 1 scrutiny simply by giving the
ongoing violation a name and label.”154 If the opposite were true, all
trade associations would simply define their activities as amateurism
as a way to circumvent the antitrust laws.

V. Why Lower Court Decisions Holding the NCAA
Eligibility Rules to Be Procompetitive
Are Similarly Misguided
In addition to the aforementioned cases, four lower court decisions
have upheld NCAA rules related to eligibility under the rule of reason
based on their purported procompetitive benefits.155 And much like
the eight lower court decisions that found the NCAA to be

151. Id. at 93.
152. See id. at 86, 94 (discussing several of these types of agreements,
including a $10.6 million deal between Auburn University and Under
Armour); see also Edelman, supra note 19 (discussing the payment of
royalties from the videogame maker Electronic Arts to the NCAA for
use of the NCAA names, marks, and perhaps even player identities in
their game).
153. Hennessey, 564 F.2d at 1150 (“[The NCAA and its members] are
significantly involved in interstate commerce in the conduct of the
athletic programs.”).
154. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2213 (2010).
155. A number of other cases not discussed in this section have also found
NCAA rules to survive the rule of reason based on the plaintiff’s failure
to meet his burden with respect to showing either market power or
antitrust harm. See, e.g., Warrior Sports, Inc. v. NCAA, 623 F.3d 281
(6th Cir. 2010) (holding that a rule changing the acceptable size of the
heads of lacrosse sticks did not unreasonably restrain trade or commerce
in violation of the Sherman Act); Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d
1059 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a rule that discouraged a studentathlete from transferring colleges within a single conference did not have
significant anticompetitive effects within any relevant antitrust market).
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noncommercial, each of these four additional decisions suffers from
one or more legal defects.
A.

Cases Finding the NCAA Eligibility Rules Are Procompetitive

The first decision to find an NCAA eligibility rule, although
commercial, to be procompetitive was the Fifth Circuit’s 1977 ruling
in Hennessey v. NCAA.156 There, the court held that a challenge to
the NCAA’s limit on the number of coaches per team “come[s] close,
but fall[s] short” under a rule of reason analysis.157 In finding the limit
on coaches to be procompetitive, the court explained that the rule
had a reasonable “motive” of assisting colleges with less funding to
“preserve and foster competition” on equal terms.158 Thus, the court
expressed fear that if it did not uphold the NCAA’s bylaw, a war of
attrition would ensue, resulting in some colleges devoting all of their
resources to college athletics.159
Six years later in Justice v. NCAA,160 the District of Arizona
upheld an NCAA bylaw that had disqualified the University of
Arizona football team from competing in postseason play after its
players accepted prohibited benefits such as free transportation and
lodging.161 In upholding the team’s ban from postseason play, the
Justice court explained that the NCAA postseason eligibility rules
were procompetitive because they “have been shown to lack an
anticompetitive purpose and to be directly related to the NCAA
objectives of preserving amateurism and promoting fair
competition.”162 In addition, the court noted that “NCAA regulations
designed to preserve amateurism and fair competition have previously
been upheld as reasonable restraints [of trade] under the rule of
reason”—citing Hennessey, Jones, and even Athletic Placement
Service, Inc.163
Thereafter, the Fifth Circuit held in its 1988 decision McCormack
v. NCAA164 that a college football player’s challenge to the NCAA
death penalty failed under the rule of reason.165 In rejecting the
156. 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977).
157. Id. at 1154.
158. Id. at 1153.
159. Id. (“Financial pressures upon many members, not merely to ‘catch up’,
but to ‘keep up’, were beginning to threaten both the competitive, and
amateur, nature of the programs . . . .”).
160. 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983).
161. See id. at 383.
162. Id. at 382.
163. Id.
164. 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988).
165. Id. at 1344.
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football player’s challenge, the court differentiated its holding from
that of Board of Regents by quoting that case for the proposition
that, unlike rules that govern television broadcast markets, rules that
determine who is eligible to compete in college football games
“enhance public interest in intercollegiate athletics” and support an
“academic tradition” that lies at the core of the unique character of
college athletics.166 The court further quoted Board of Regents for the
proposition that “[i]t is reasonable to assume that most of the
regulatory controls of the NCAA are justifiable means of fostering
competition,” and that one of the NCAA rules that can be viewed as
procompetitive is “athletes must get paid.”167
Finally, the Seventh Circuit held in Banks v. NCAA168 that the
NCAA bylaws that prevent student-athletes from exploring
professional opportunities were procompetitive based on the same
Board of Regents language that was cited by McCormack.169 Banks
further described the plaintiff’s antitrust claim as “absurd” because,
in the court’s opinion, “the NCAA does not exist as a minor league
training ground for future NFL players but rather to provide an
opportunity for competition among amateur students pursuing a
collegiate education.”170
B.

Why Each of These Four Cases Was Wrongly Decided

Much like the eight decisions that found the NCAA to be
noncommercial, these four decisions finding NCAA eligibility rules to
be procompetitive are easily rebutted based on their substantial
analytical errors. For example, the very first decision to find an
NCAA eligibility rule to be procompetitive, Hennessey v. NCAA,171
ruled in this manner primarily because the NCAA rule kept member
costs down.172 But this holding contradicts longstanding antitrust
doctrine embedded within many Supreme Court decisions. Indeed, as
166. Id.
167. Id. (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85,
102 (1984)).
168. 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992).
169. Id. at 1089.
170. See id. at 1089–90. In this vein, the appellate court noted that “[t]he nodraft rule has no more impact on the market for college football players
than other NCAA eligibility requirements such as grades, semester hours
carried, or requiring a high school diploma.” See id. at 1087–88.
171. 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977).
172. Id. at 1153 (“[The NCAA bylaw] was . . . intended to be an ‘economy
measure’. . . . by curtailing . . . potentially monopolistic practices by the
more powerful [schools] . . . and to reorient the programs into their
traditional role as amateur sports operating as part of the educational
process.”).
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far back as the 1897 decision United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight
Association,173 the Supreme Court has held that keeping costs down is
not a relevant procompetitive benefit under a rule of reason inquiry.174
Meanwhile, the Court explained in United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co.175 that if businesses were allowed to restrain trade simply as a
way of saving money, “the Sherman Act would . . . be emasculated”
because this defense would apply to most, if not all, combinations.176
Another defect with the Hennessey decision is that, much like
Jones, Hennessey focused extensively on the NCAA’s “motive” of
allowing colleges, irrespective of their athletic funding, to compete on
equal terms.177 Although such analysis at one time may have been
within the bounds of an acceptable rule of reason inquiry, the
Supreme Court clarified in Professional Engineers that any proper
rule of reason analysis must turn on the competitive significance of
the restraint rather than whether the restraint is “in the interest of
the members of [the] industry.”178 Thus, even a positive, noneconomic
motive can no longer save an otherwise illegal restraint.
The court’s analysis in Justice made the similar error of relying
on social benefits rather than procompetitive effects.179 There, the
plaintiffs on appeal suggested that recognizing such benefits

173. 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
174. Id. at 304, 341 (applying the Sherman Act to a railroad price-fixing
agreement—which defendants claimed benefited “patrons of the railway
line . . . and the public at large”—and stating that an agreement’s
“violation of law [cannot] be made valid by allegation of good intention
or of desire to simply maintain reasonable rates”). Furthermore, the
court held that intent is not an element that requires proof in an
antitrust case. Id. (“[T]he intent alleged . . . is not necessary to be
proved. The question is one of law in regard to the meaning and effect
of the agreement itself, namely: Does the agreement restrain trade or
commerce in any way so as to be a violation of the act?”); see also
Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 350 n.22 (1982)
(citing Trans-Missouri for the proposition that “in the first price-fixing
case arising under the Sherman Act, the Court was required to pass on
the sufficiency of the defendants’ plea that they had established rates
that were actually beneficial to the consumers”).
175. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
176. Id. at 221.
177. Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1153 (5th Cir. 1977).
178. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
179. See Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 382 (D. Ariz. 1983) (“The
sanctions imposed by the NCAA in this case are reasonably related to
the legitimate goals of preserving amateurism and promoting fair
competition . . . .”); see also Hennessey, 564 F.2d at 1153 (noting that
the NCAA “is endowed with certain benefits to society”).
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contradicted the Supreme Court’s ruling in Professional Engineers.180
Nevertheless, the court in Justice discarded these concerns with a
mere footnote, stating that “[t]he plaintiffs’ contention is belied by a
number of cases decided subsequent to Professional Engineers which
have upheld comparable self-regulatory actions of sports organizations
under the rule of reason.”181 The court never even analyzed the four
cases cited in support of its conclusion—each of which was arguably
inapposite to both Professional Engineers and the case at hand.182
180. See Justice, 577 F. Supp. at 382 n.17 (“The plaintiffs argue that the
rationale of Hennessey and Jones is no longer applicable in light of
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States and that the
NCAA cannot justify actions which exclude a competition by assessing a
‘social’ purpose such as promoting amateurism or ‘fair competition’
under the rule of reason.” (citation omitted)).
181. See id. Upon review of these four cases, there is a strong argument that
three of them do not support a trade association’s right to self-regulate
on the basis of purely social benefits, notwithstanding a limited carveout for safety and industry-wide liability mentioned by a footnote in
Professional Engineers. 435 U.S. at 696 n.22.
Far from a purely social benefit, the first case upheld a rule based on
the market’s ability to respond. Gunter Harz Sports, Inc. v. U.S.T.A.,
665 F.2d 222, 223 (8th Cir. 1981) (upholding a tennis association’s rule
that allowed only single-strung rackets in competition, recognizing that
competition rules pertaining to the type of eligible playing equipment do
not cause “antitrust harm” in the conventional sense because all
equipment manufacturers can alter their product to conform with the
association’s equipment rules); accord Warrior Sports, Inc. v. NCAA,
623 F.3d 281, 285 (6th Cir. 2010) (upholding a lacrosse league’s
equipment rules for a similar reason).
The second case fits squarely within the safety-industry liability
exception mentioned in Professional Engineers. Neeld v. NHL, 594 F.2d
1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1979) (upholding an NHL bylaw that precluded a
player with just one eye from competition because the primary purpose
of the rule was safety and avoiding league-wide liability); Professional
Engineers, 435 U.S. at 696 n.22; see also Edelman, supra note 42, at 653
(explaining how the Professional Engineers carve-out applies to Neeld).
The third case can be interpreted as applying the safety-industry
liability exception to horses. See Cooney v. Am. Horse Shows Ass’n,
496 F. Supp. 424, 427, 430–32 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (upholding a bylaw that
subjects a trainer to possible suspension based on the presence of drugs
in a horse for which the trainer was responsible). Cooney may constitute
a ruling based implicitly on the safety-liability standard (as applied to
horses) because the court stated that the trainer, “more than anyone
else, was in a position to know exactly who administered the drug.” Id.
at 433.
The fourth case presents a far closer call because the plaintiff failed to
present “a patently anticompetitive purpose” behind the World Boxing
Association’s suspension rule. See Brenner v. World Boxing Council,
675 F.2d 445, 456 (2d Cir. 1981).
182. Justice, 577 F. Supp. at 382 n.17.
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McCormack presented a very different type of problem for the
courts, as the factual background in that case was somewhat
bizarre.183 The party most directly harmed by the NCAA’s death
penalty sanction—Southern Methodist University—had previously
agreed to accept the sanction and thus was not a party to the case.184
Meanwhile, the original plaintiff was merely an alumnus of the school
and his claim was rejected due to lack of standing.185 As a result, the
court was left to grapple with the claims of the football player
plaintiffs, who were initially joined to the case by McCormack solely
as a way to try to preserve his standing.186
In addressing the football players’ claims, the McCormack court
properly turned to Board of Regents as the most appropriate
precedent.187 However—perhaps troubled by the bizarre posture of the
case—the court gerrymandered the language in Board of Regents to
rule in favor of the NCAA.188 For example, the language quoted by
McCormack to support its finding that the NCAA’s death-penalty
sanction was procompetitive actually came from a section of Board of
Regents that explained why NCAA conduct should be reviewed under
the full rule of reason rather than the per se test.189 Even more
troublesome, the exact language from that case actually states that
the NCAA’s amateurism rules should be analyzed under the full rule
of reason by a court because they “can be viewed as
procompetitive.”190 By using the word “can” rather than “must” and
using it in the context of determining the proper test for reviewing
NCAA conduct, it is not clear that the Board of Regents court
concluded the NCAA’s no-pay rules were procompetitive.191 Thus, the
183. See McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1340 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting
the plaintiffs’ allegations that the NCAA’s actions “deprived [alumni]
and others of ‘their right to associate together in support of the
University by attendance at the football games of the University,’ while
the football players have been ‘forced to discontinue their athleteacademic duties’ at SMU and the cheerleaders have lost the opportunity
to lead cheers at football games”).
184. See id. at 1341 (explaining that Southern Methodist University did not
appeal the NCAA’s decision).
185. Id.
186. See id. at 1340 (noting that McCormack amended his complaint to
include football players after the first complaint was dismissed for
failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted).
187. Id. at 1343.
188. Id. at 1344.
189. Id. at 1343–44.
190. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 102 (1984)
(emphasis added).
191. Id. (emphasis added).
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actual language in Board of Regents never truly supported
McCormack’s conclusion.192
Finally, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Banks likewise
misconstrued the language in Board of Regents to reach a conclusion
starkly different from the Supreme Court’s inference in that case.193
This error was pointed out by Judge Joel Flaum in a vigorous dissent,
in which he concluded that “the market at issue here is the college
football labor market” and “[i]f the no-draft rule were scuttled,
colleges that promised their athletes the opportunity to test the
waters in the NFL draft . . . would be more attractive to athletes
than colleges that declined to offer the same opportunity.”194
Thereafter, Justice Harry Blackmun, in reviewing a bench
memorandum assessing whether to grant certiorari in Banks, opined
by hand on his memo that “CA7 got this one dead wrong.”195
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court ultimately declined certiorari—
preventing Justice Blackmun from coining an opinion that would have
potentially overturned Banks and its progeny.196

VI. Why Closer Game Scores Cannot Save the NCAA
No-Pay Rules but May Support Preserving Such Rules
on a Conference-by-Conference Basis
Finally, even beyond the above decisions that have granted
unusually broad deference to the NCAA rules, numerous other
sources, including law review articles and newspaper editorials, argue
in favor of the NCAA no-pay rules for yet another reason—they
improve the quality of college sports contests by keeping game scores

192. Id.; see also McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1344 (5th Cir. 1998).
193. See Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1089 (7th Cir. 1992) (quoting and
subsequently misapplying the following language from Board of Regents:
“most of the regulatory controls of the NCAA [are] a justifiable means
of fostering competition among the amateur athletic teams and therefore
are procompetitive because they enhance public interest in
intercollegiate athletics” (quoting Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 104)).
194. Id. at 1081, 1095 (Flaum, J., dissenting).
195. See Preliminary Memorandum to Justice Blackmun on Banks v. Nat’l
Collegiate
Athletic
Ass’n
(May
14,
1993),
available
at
http://epstein.usc.edu/research/blackmunMemos/1992/92Memo-pdf/921466.pdf; see also Geoffrey Rapp, Banks v. NCAA Cert Pool Memo:
“Seventh Circuit Dead Wrong,” SPORTS LAW BLOG, (Sept. 28, 2007,
1:04 PM), http://sports-law.blogspot.com/2007/09/banks-v-ncaa-certpool-memo-seventh.html (describing Supreme Court bench memo on
Banks petition with Justice Blackmun’s handwritten comments).
196. See Banks, 508 U.S. at 908.
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closer together.197 Currently, antitrust law is in flux as to whether
equalizing on-field competition serves as a relevant procompetitive
benefit. On the one hand, past decisions such as Smith v. Pro
Football, Inc.198 and Mackey v. NFL199 have held that closer scores can
never offset an otherwise anticompetitive labor restraint.200 But on the
other hand, dictum in the Supreme Court’s recent American
Needle, Inc. v. NFL201 decision notes that “‘the interest in
maintaining competitive balance’ among ‘athletic teams is legitimate
and important.’”202
Without going into the competitive merits of a restraint that
helps to equalize game results (a topic perhaps worthy of an entirely
separate article), that argument does little to save the NCAA’s nopay rules because there are other, less restrictive ways that colleges
can level the sports playing field short of imposing a national,
industry-wide bar on student-athlete compensation. For example,
colleges could just as easily implement salary caps at the conference
level rather than at the league level.203 Given that most college
sporting events are played by teams from within a single conference, a
conference-wide salary cap would have much the same effect of
197. See LeRoy, supra note 73, at 1093 (explaining that labor restraints on
college sports markets have procompetitive effects by “spreading, and
preserving in place, the supply of talented players and making games
more interesting”); see also David Brooks, The Amateur Ideal, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 23, 2011, at A35 (commenting that no-pay rules force an
“obsessively competitive group, to pay homage to academic pursuits”
and that “college basketball is more thrilling than pro basketball
because the game is still animated by amateur passions, not coldly
calculating professional interests”).
198. 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
199. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
200. See Smith, 593 F.2d at 1186 (finding the NFL draft’s “alleged[ ]
‘procompetitive’ . . . effect on the playing field” to be “nil”); Mackey,
543 F.2d at 621 (“[T]he possibility of resulting decline in the quality of
play would not justify the Rozelle Rule.”).
201. 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010).
202. Id. at 2217 (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85, 117 (1984)).
203. See Daniel A. Rascher & Andrew D. Schwarz, Neither Reasonable nor
Necessary: “Amateurism” in Big-Time College Sports, Antitrust,
Spring 2010, at 51, 54–55 (2000) (arguing that a reasonable alternative
under antitrust law would be to “devolve power from the NCAA to the
various collegiate conferences” and allow the conferences to compete
against one another for student-athletes). See generally James V. Koch,
The Economic Realities of Amateur Sports Organization, 61 IND. L.J. 9,
22 (1985) (discussing how the NCAA has already made a “clear attempt
to group together members who have similar revenues, costs, and output
characteristics”).
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equalizing game scores without having the same ubiquitous,
anticompetitive effect on college sports labor markets as do the
NCAA’s current no-pay rules.204
Indeed, rules governing student-athlete pay at the conference
level, as a matter of antitrust law, would likely be far less restrictive
to student-athletes, colleges, and consumers because individual
conferences lack sufficient “market power” within any relevant market
to illegally restrain trade.205 Thus, each individual sports conference
represents just a small share of the overall college sports
marketplace.206
Furthermore, as a practical matter, conference-wide salary caps
on student-athlete pay are unlikely to lead to a ubiquitous ban on
student-athlete compensation. This is because some conferences would
likely opt to allow student-athletes to receive money as a means to
compete most effectively for student-athlete labor on an interconference basis.207 Meanwhile, other conferences might opt to allow
student-athlete pay after recognizing that taking the moral high
ground may make some consumers more interested in purchasing
204. See generally Eric Thieme, Note, You Can’t Win ’Em All: How the
NCAA’s Dominance of the College Basketball Postseason Reveals There
Will Never Be an NCAA Football Playoff, 40 IND. L. REV. 453 (2007)
(discussing how the distribution of revenue evenly to conferences by the
BCS promotes parity in those conferences).
205. See Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001)
(finding the market for college athletes’ labor to be “national in scope”);
see also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962)
(explaining that a relevant market is defined by “the interchangeability
of use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the product and
substitutes for it”); Worldwide Basketball & Sport Tours, Inc. v.
NCAA, 388 F.3d 955, 958–59 (6th Cir. 2004) (explaining that a
“relevant market encompasses notions of geography as well as product
use, quality and description” and that “reasonable interchangeability” is
the standard for determining the limits of a given relevant market)
(citations omitted); cf. Hairston v. Pac. 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315,
1319–20 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that the enforcement of a rule created
at the conference level that prevents colleges from paying their athletes
was permissible under the rule of reason).
206. See Tanaka, 252 F.3d at 1063–64 (suggesting that an athlete unhappy
with the Pacific 10 Conference’s rules against intra-conference transfers
should simply join a college team that participates in a different
conference); cf. Marc Edelman, Does the NBA Still Have “Market
Power?” Exploring the Antitrust Implications of an Increasingly Global
Market for Men’s Basketball Player Labor, 41 Rutgers L.J. 549, 583–
84 (calling into doubt whether the court’s holding in Tanaka makes
sense from a workers’ rights perspective given that it required a studentathlete to move away from her home market to avoid the effects of a
collusive agreement).
207. See generally Tanaka, 252 F.3d at 1064 (noting that athletic conferences
“compete in the recruiting of student-athletes”).
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game tickets, apparel, and other paraphernalia from those particular
conferences.208

Conclusion
Over the past century, NCAA members have enjoyed immense
profits by enforcing a principle of amateurism that keeps the revenues
of college athletics away from student-athletes.209 But even though
this principle of amateurism has become well embedded in the
NCAA’s identity, it does not comport with traditional principles of
antitrust law and free trade. To the contrary, the NCAA’s principle of
amateurism likely violates section 1 of the Sherman Act by artificially
prohibiting student-athlete pay and by eliminating from the college
sports marketplace those colleges that wish to recruit top studentathletes.
Although eight lower courts have found the NCAA’s eligibility
rules to be noncommercial and thus exempt from the Sherman Act,
each of these decisions is wrongly decided. Many of these decisions
ignore Supreme Court precedent explaining that competitive
restraints in educational markets are to be viewed identically to
competitive restraints in all other markets. Meanwhile, many other
decisions disregard persuasive factual evidence indicating that college
sports today have become a multibillion-dollar enterprise that engages
in “interstate commerce.”
Furthermore, four lower courts have held that the NCAA
eligibility rules survive under the rule of reason inquiry based on these
rules’ purported procompetitive benefits. Nevertheless, these decisions
are similarly flawed. Most of these decisions that find NCAA
eligibility rules to be procompetitive focus on the rules’ original
intent, impact on member costs, and social policy goals—all factors
that the Supreme Court has found to be irrelevant to a proper
antitrust analysis. Moreover, some of these rulings have been
expressly called into doubt by Judge Blackmun’s handwritten
comments in Banks—leaving open the possibility that the Supreme
Court does not agree with that case’s outcome.
Of course, a proper antitrust analysis does not necessarily prohibit
all agreements among colleges with respect to student-athlete
208. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (“[The
Sherman Act] rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of
competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic
resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest
materials progress . . . .”).
209. See Edelman, supra note 5, at 864–65 (noting that the wealth generated
by college athletics remains in the hands of a select few administrators,
athletic directors, and coaches because student-athletes are prevented
from profiting based upon their athletic abilities).
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compensation. But a proper analysis would certainly prohibit those
agreements where the parties agreeing to the restraint have “market
power.” Thus, as a practical matter, overturning the NCAA no-pay
rules would simply shift governance of student-athlete compensation
to the discretion of individual athletic conferences. Such a shift would
be advantageous to student-athletes, colleges, and consumers.
For all of these reasons, it is likely a mere matter of time before a
court enjoins the NCAA’s enforcement of its principle of amateurism.
Until then, the NCAA has a choice—it can either proactively rewrite
its rulebook in a manner that complies with the spirit of U.S.
antitrust law, or it can wait until a court mandates such changes.
Either way, however, it seems inevitable that the NCAA’s
longstanding practice of profiting from the work product of studentathletes is about to change. Simply stated, antitrust law does not
permit the NCAA to impose rules that ubiquitously prevent studentathlete pay.
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